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MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: NATIVE AMERICAN





The wrong has been committed.
The important thing is who will redeem it.'
George Seferis
I. INTRODUCTION
If history, as suggested by the influential writer Simone Weil,
is simply the propaganda of the victors,2 then much of the (domi-
nant) history concerning Native Americans becomes inherently
suspect. This history is not necessarily false or erroneous, but
rather, something worthy of close scrutiny, intense reflection, and
energetic dialogue. The books3 under review in this essay provide
a rich opportunity for such scrutiny, and one of them even
presents an analytical and theoretical framework with which to
evaluate and to mediate particular claims and assertions.
History plays an absolutely central role in the enterprise of
Indian law because much of the field rests on construing and inter-
preting the legacy of time.4 Specifically, for example, there is the
question about what is (or ought to be) the meaning of treaties and
other federal statutes entered into or enacted in the early days of
the national republic. In addition, what were our original under-
standings of these sovereign commitments on which we make con-
* Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law.
1. JOHN MONTAGUE, THE ROUGH FIELD, frontispiece (1989) (quoting George Seferis).
2. See, e.g., THE SIMONE WEIL READER 184-257 (George A. Panichas ed., 1977)
(addressing the problems of "uprootedness and nationhood").
3. EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE (THE Sioux NATION VERSUS THE
UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT) (1991); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); NATIVE AMERICAN
TESTIMONY (A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM PROPHECY TO THE
PRESENT, 1492-1992) (Peter Nabokov ed., 1992).
Please note that the word "Lakota" is the traditional linguistic reference used by the
Teton Sioux people to describe themselves in their own language. The word "Sioux" is a
French corruption of a Chippewa word which means snake or adder and was used by the
Chippewas in a derogatory fashion to describe their traditional enemy, the Lakota. For this
reason, "Lakota" is the preferred term, although popular and legal usage has made the
word "Sioux" a much more conventional and well-known term. The terms are used
interchangeably throughout the text.
4. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 13-14 (1987).
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temporary judgments? In the context of Indian law, history looms
not just as a colorful backdrop, but rather as an inescapable
shadow. The failure to adequately confront and comprehend this
history inevitably threatens to blot out understanding and resolu-
tion of significant Indian law issues involving treaties, tribal sover-
eignty, and the commitment to a flourishing tribal life.
A group of significant themes pertinent to this quandary of
time and understanding present themselves in these works and
serve as the cornerstone for this review. They include: 1) the
arrogance of many well-meaning people whose naive attempt to
support Native American sovereignty only inhibits these endeav-
ors (hereinafter referred to as Indian law liberalism); 2) the signifi-
cance of Indian country context and situatedness in the field of
Indian law; and 3) the dilemma of difference and justice in Indian
affairs. Each of the books discussed in this essay touches on these
themes with varying degrees of sophistication and intensity, but
they place greater emphasis elsewhere, without providing sus-
tained insight on these issues. The method employed to get at
these themes in this review will be to discuss the book Black
Hills/White Justice as the text upon which Native American Testi-
mony and Making All the Difference provide valuable (indirect)
commentary, that occasionally is not without shortfalls of its own.
This critique, in combination with these three works, suggests
some valuable protocols for thinking about Native Americans, his-
tory, and reconciliation.
II. THESES AND "REASONS" 5
Black Hills/White Justice by Edward Lazarus, son of one of
the prominent claims attorneys for the Sioux Nation, purports to
describe the events and tell the story of the Sioux Nation versus
the United States from 1775 to the present. The facts of this legal
and moral saga are easily summarized. The Black Hills, which are
located in the western part of present day South Dakota, were
originally part of the Great Sioux Nation Reservation recognized
in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868.6 Article XII of the Fort Lara-
mie Treaty provided that any future land cessions by the Great
Sioux Nation to the federal government would have to be
approved by three-fourths of the adult male population.7
5. NABOKOV, supra note 3, at XXI. "One tribesman explained, 'Yes, you are a people
of reasons, you always have reasons for this, reasons for that.'"




After a scientific expedition, led by General George Custer,
discovered gold in this beautiful and sumptuous landscape, the
federal government undertook negotiations with the Great Sioux
Nation to secure cession of the Black Hills. These negotiations
failed on several different occasions, and ultimately the United
States unilaterally--and in violation of the Fort Laramie Treaty of
1868-confiscated 7.7 million acres of land pursuant to the Black
Hills Act of 1877.8
At the time of this "taking," federal law prohibited any Indian
tribe from suing the United States unless the federal government
specifically waived its traditional immunity from suit.9 When the
Black Hills were taken, there was no jurisdictional statute that
would permit suit by the Sioux Nation against the United States.
In 1920, a special jurisdiction act was passed, permitting the Sioux
Nation to sue the United States in this matter, and only then was
the legal controversy finally joined. This lawsuit (judicially)
culminated sixty years later when the United States Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the Great Sioux Nation in 1980.1' The
Court held that the federal government had taken the Black Hills
pursuant to its powers of eminent domain, but that it had failed to
pay adequate compensation. The Court ordered the federal gov-
ernment to pay the Great Sioux Nation approximately 17.5 million
dollars plus five percent interest figured from the time of the tak-
ing in 1877. This interest award made the total initial judgment
more then one hundred million dollars. Yet, the constituent
tribes' of the Great Sioux Nation refused (and still refuse) to
accept any portion of the award until some or all of the land
involved is returned to the Lakota people. It is on the issue of land
return, and the various historical and cultural differences it illus-
trates, that the Lazarus book not only fails, but perpetuates certain
negative myths and harmful stereotypes about Native Americans
and their cultural aspirations. 12
8. See Black Hills Act, art. 1, 19 Stat. 254 (1877).
9. 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863).
10. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
11. The constituent tribes consist of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Oglala Sioux Tribe,
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, Lower
Brule Sioux Tribe, Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, and the Fort Peck Sioux of Montana.
12. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. It is necessary to note here that Black
Hills!White Justice follows an unusual format. Despite the fact that this 400-plus page book
deals with diverse historical and contemporary materials and quotes extensively from both,
there are no footnotes. There is instead only a generalized "Notes on Sources." LAZARUS,
supra note 3, at 459-70. This is unfortunate to say the least. I have never been a proponent
of a heavy scholarly apparatus overkill, but its complete absence in such a "comprehensive"
work is extremely disconcerting.
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On balance, the straight legal narrative presented by Mr. Laz-
arus is informative and often even compelling. This story, unlike
much of the law, does have intense drama. Part of the drama
involves the role of the attorneys. Since the author is the son of
one of the main claims attorneys, it is perhaps not surprising that
they are given prominence in its telling. There is, for example, the
initial decision of the tribes, after a certain amount of give and
take, to hire Ralph Case, a local South Dakota attorney, to pursue
the claim. Despite Mr. Case's enormous goodwill with the Great
Sioux Nation, the claim was bungled until Arthur Lazarus and
Marvin Sonosky13 were brought in to replace him in 1957. The
author succinctly describes Case's efforts as a "tragic combination
of passionate commitment and unlawyerly argument."14 He sum-
marizes his efforts:
In thirty-five years, two courts [Court of Claims and
Indian Claims Commission] in three decisions had dis-
missed or rejected the Black Hills claim. On the merits,
both the Commission and the Court of Claims had ruled
not only that Case had proceeded on an untenable theory
of valuation, but that the government's treatment of the
Sioux had been reasonable under the circumstances, and
even generous.
Still lost in the wilderness, now despairing of the
promised land, the Sioux did not need another Moses;
they needed a conjurer to raise their claim from the
dead.' -'
Eventually, the new legal team assembled a "winning" strat-
egy, which included, among other things, a successful motion to
set aside the 1956 Court of Claims decision based on Ralph Cases'
incompetence,' 6 and to persuade Congress to pass a statute in
1978 to avoid resjudicata problems with the previous decision of
the Court of Claims.' r Additionally, the new legal team developed
the ultimately successful "taking claim" theory, arguing that the
United States "took" the Black Hills in an exercise of its eminent
domain power, but that it denied the Great Sioux Nation due pro-
13. Mr. Lazarus and Mr. Sonosky represented the Oglala Sioux Tribe, Rosebud Sioux
Tribe, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, and
the Santee Tribe of Nebraska. William Howard Payne represented the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe and the Fort Peck Sioux of Montana. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 231.
14. LAZARUS, supra note 3 at 201.
15. Id. at 216.
16. Id. at 228-34.
17. Id. at 347-65.
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cess under the Fifth Amendment by not paying just compensa-
tion. 8 All of this is not an inconsiderable achievement, but
Lazarus portrays the Great Sioux Nation as merely a spectator to
this gripping drama. The people of the Great Sioux Nation are
described as "untutored clients,"' 9 who "were blind and mute,
entirely dependent on the white experts with whom they had
deposited their faith to guide them successfully through the laby-
rinth of law."2 0
The book, Native American Testimony, counters this dis-
turbing silence that Mr. Lazarus posits with its wide-ranging
chronicle of Indian voices in the history of Indian-White relations
from "prophecy to the present." None of these voices specifically
addresses the Black Hills issue, but many touch on the following
core issues: (1) the significance of landscape in Native American
thought and culture, and (2) Indian perception of the nature of
non-Indian behavior and philosophy. Discussion of these core
issues seems almost gratuitously omitted from the Lazarus book.
These voices are not simply a chorus of vilification, but are
rather nuanced and varied in their braid of response. The Native
American statements are grouped chronologically by editor Peter
Nabokov in nineteen chapters (with brief introductions) ranging
from "premonitions and prophecies" to "facing the future." They
run the gamut from the metaphysical observation of Black Elk
(Oglala) that "[s]ometimes dreams are wiser than waking," 21 to the
declaration of Big Bear (Otoe) that "we all work. But you cannot
make white men of us. That is one thing you cannot do."' 22 Such
voices reveal a vital counterpoint to the mostly univocal narrative
of Mr. Lazarus' work. 23
Professor Martha Minow's book, Making All the Difference,
describes a very helpful conceptual framework for thinking about
the creation and persistence of difference in American law. In
such a diverse society, which has been troubled about matters of
race, class, and gender from its very beginning, the issue of "differ-
18. Id. at 383-402. This element was critical in the area of damages. Fifth Amendment
takings require payment of five percent interest. Interest is not charged against the
wrongdoer if the violation is brought under the Indian Claims Commission Act. In the
context of the Black Hills claim, the difference between a claim brought under the Fifth
Amendment and a claim brought under the Indian Claims Commission Act was $102
million versus $17.5 million (as of 1980). Since there has been no distribution of this money
to date, interest is still accumulating.
19. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 235.
20. Id. at 236.
21. NABOKOV, supra note 3, at 17.
22. Id. at 139.
23. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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ence" within the legal system has always been central. This work
elucidates the recurrent themes of inclusion and.exclusion within
the dominant legal system with a particular focus on its paradoxes
and troubling inconsistencies. Professor Minow, displaying keen
insight, describes difference as being largely socially constructed
around the often hidden norm of white, able-bodied, middle class
males.2 4 In addition, Professor Minow suggests that the mask of
difference is often used to hide misallocations and distortions of
power.2 5
Professor Minow also includes an illuminating discussion of
what she calls the "dilemma of difference," which raises pertinent
issues that arise when there is an attempt to ameliorate the harms
caused by the invidious use of difference. There is, for example,
the potential to exacerbate the difference which exists by pretend-
ing it does not exist or by calling undue attention to it in the first
instance.26 Surprisingly, and particularly unfortunate for the pur-
poses of this review, Making All the Difference makes almost no
reference to race, and only limited reference to Native Ameri-
cans. Nevertheless, Professor Minow provides a serviceable and
helpful analytic rubric to apply to some of the most glaring decla-
rations and omissions in the work of Mr. Lazarus.
III. ARROGANCE AND INDIAN LAW LIBERALISM
Indian law liberalism, despite its benevolent intention to
"help" Indians, has often lapsed into a harmful and hurtful arro-
gance. The liberalism to which I refer is the kind of liberalism
practiced by one who inherently "knows" what is best for others,
particularly those who are situated outside mainstream, middle-
class America. Mr. Lazarus' book is clearly cut from this cloth.
24. MINOW, supra note 3, at 49-78.
25. Id. at 111-13.
26. Id. at 19-48. For example, legal and personal harm in the context of racial
discrimination is accentuated by ignoring its existence, while it is also sometimes contended
that affirmative action plans are flawed because they call attention to the invidious
"differences" such plans are designed to combat.
27. Id. at 351-56 (reviewing the litigation involving the Mashpee Indians of
Massachusetts in Mashpee Tribe v. Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd., 592
F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979)). In Mashpee Tribe, the Mashpee Indians claimed that 16,000 acres
of land on Cape Cod belonged to their tribe. Ultimately, the case turned on the predicate
question of whether the plaintiff Indians were a "tribe" under the Non-Intercourse Act.
Both courts ruled in the negative. Professor Minow's discussion focuses on the social
construction of the term "tribe," "especially as a concept defined by whites to describe and
regulate nonwhites." Id. at 355. In addition, there are the problems of contending
narratives where the perspectives of the inquirer and the perspective of the evaluator
become critical. Id. Professor Minow's observations are quite insightful in this regard.
Unfortunately, Professor Minow does not provide any examples (like the Black Hills case)
analyzing the issue of differences where tribes admittedly do exist.
342 [Vol. 69:337
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One of the best historical examples of this arrogance in the
area of Indian law can be found in the testimony articulated in
support of the allotment process. This discussion, which took place
in the latter part of the nineteenth century, focused on the ques-
tion of whether it would be in the best interests of Indian people
to divide the communal land on the reservation into individual
Indian-held allotments. This issue was resolved in the affirmative
and culminated in the passage of the Dawes Severalty Act in
1887.28
The results of this Act were truly devastating. The national
Indian land estate diminished from 134 million acres to slightly
more than 50 million acres in 1934, a staggering loss of nearly 90
million acres.29 A leading chronicler of the Allotment Era
observed "[t]hat the leading proponents of allotment were
inspired by the highest motives seems conclusively true. A mem-
ber of Congress, speaking on the Dawes bill in 1886 said, 'It has...
the endorsement of the Indian rights associations throughout the
country, and of the best sentiment of the land.' "o30 The notion was
that allotment would bring material progress and deter non-
Indian predation. It did neither. Yet, it had the unequivocal sup-
port of non-Indian Indian rights groups throughout the country.
The well meaning allotment supporters did not find it necessary to
confer with Indian people and tribes to solicit their views. They
knew best.
Yet there were eloquent Indian voices set against allotment.
For example, from the Rosebud Sioux Reservation, Chief Hollow
Horn Bear said:
28. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1983)).
29. WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 20. More than twenty-six million acres of allotted land
was transferred from the tribe to individual Indian allottees and then passed to non-Indians
through sale, fraud, mortgage foreclosures, and tax sales. Id.
Sixty million of the eighty-six million acres lost by Indians during the Allotment Era
were lost because of the "surplus" land provisions of the Act. Id. According to historian
Father Francis Prucha, thirty-eight million acres of unallotted tribal lands were declared
"surplus" to Indian needs and were ceded to the federal government for sale to non-
Indians. The federal government allowed another twenty-two million acres of "surplus"
tribal land to be homesteaded. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 896 (1984).
The ravages of the allotment policy were halted only by the Indian Reorganization of 1934,
Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 461-78
(1983)), which permanently extended the trust status of all existing allotments and halted
the issuance of any new allotments.
The allotment policy was vigorously endorsed within the Indian Service. 'The common
field is the seat of barbarianism,' proclaimed an Indian agent; 'the separate farm [is] the
door to civilization.' A commissioner of Indian Affairs explained in 1880, '[the Indian] must
be imbued with the exalting egotism of American civilization so that he will say 'I' instead
of 'We' and 'This is mine' instead of 'This is ours."' NABOKOV, supra note 3, at 233.
30. D.S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 8 (1973).
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"My friends, you have all heard what my father-in-law
says, but I do not think he is right. He believes what the
white people tell him; but this is only another trick of the
whites to take our land away from us, and they have
played these tricks before. We do not want to trust the
white people. They come to us with sweet talk, but they
do not mean it. We will not sign any more papers for
these white men."
All the Indians grunted "Haul" ("How!"), which
meant that they agreed with what Hollow Horn Bear
said. Then other chiefs arose and spoke. So many of them
were against the allotment that it seemed we were not to
get it, but these councils which the Indians held among
themselves were not recorded, as there were no white
persons present.3'
And from a Hopi by the name of Albert Yava:
I don't know where [Senator] Dawes got his knowledge of
Indian ways, but he was dead set against a tribe or clan
owning communal lands .... [T]he Government began to
survey the Hopi lands to divide them up, and they did all
this without any consultations with responsible Hopi lead-
ers .... They only stirred up confusion and resentment
by what they were doing.32
These voices (and others) might have made a difference if
they were heard. Their insights might have shed the necessary
light into the public and congressional debates. Yet, apparently,
they were deemed to be of no consequence and were neither
sought nor heard by their "friends. '33 And catastrophe ensued.
31. NABOKOV, supra note 3, at 242.
32. Id. at 247.
33. Support for allotment came from an unusual coalition of those who favored
opening Indian lands to non-Indian development and many Indian rights associations
throughout the country. For example:
Allotment was supported by those in Congress who favored opening Indian
lands to non-Indian development. It was also supported by many Indian agents
and Indian rights associations throughout the country. The support of the
program by eastern Indian rights advocates was evident at the Lake Mohonk
Conference in 1889. These Indian rights supporters sought to protect the Indian
in his land holding. The feeling was that an Indian holding a patent from the
federal government, restricted against alienation, enjoyed greater security for
his land tenure than the protection afforded by tribal possession. Additionally,
the program held forth the vision that the Indian would acquire the benefits of
civilization through the pursuit of sedentary agricultural life and would,
therefore, abandon his "uncivilized," nomadic, hunting tribal culture. Of course,
these paradigm extremes rarely existed in practice. Despite the fact that
agriculture already formed an important ingredient of many tribal cultures,
[Vol. 69:337344
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This instructive example seems to have eluded Mr. Lazarus.
A similar kind of intellectual and political arrogance pervades his
analysis. Despite his focus on a landscape of sacred and historical
centrality to Lakota people, their voices and views are of little con-
sequence in the book's narrative. Any corrective view would not
mean, of course, that Lakota voices would carry the day, but only
that these voices would be honestly heard and considered in the
context of a meaningful dialogue, subject-to-subject, rather than
treated with the affectless view of Native Americans inherent in
Mr. Lazarus' subject-object construction.
Another example of this arrogant liberalism can be identified
in the context of the attorney-client relationship. Mr. Lazarus
never discusses the attorney-client relationship per se. He appar-
ently does not think it is necessary or pertinent. The lawyers are
ascendant, even supreme. Yet there are some elements of the
"'successful" legal strategy employed by Lazarus and Sonosky
which their clients likely would not have approved. The attorneys
for the Sioux Nation did not seriously press the treaty issue. For
example, the lawyers did not really challenge the rationale of Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock,34 which permitted the United States to unilat-
erally abrogate treaties with Indian tribes, even when those trea-
ties explicitly required tribal approval of any future land sessions,35
as in the crucial text of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868.36 Laza-
rus and Sonosky might have used a viable legal strategy, but did
they seek what their clients wanted, particularly in the context of
significant historical and cultural differences?
Lone Wolf is cited extensively in Black Hills/White Justice,
but never with a culturally or legally critical eye. Mr. Lazarus cor-
rectly notes:
Lonewolf [sic] transmogrified the guardian-ward concept,
originally conceived for the benefit of the tribes, into a
Dickensian relationship granting the guardian extraordi-
nary powers, absolving him of any wrongdoing, and leav-
ing the ward essentially powerless. What John Marshall
envisioned as a relationship binding the government to
Congress approved the allotment program, over significant tribal opposition,
based on these cultural stereotypes.
ROBERT N. CLINTON, NELL JESSUP NEWTON, MONROE PRICE, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
149-50 (1991).
34. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
35. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 553-54 (1903).
36. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (Art. XII of the Fort Laramie Treaty of
1868).
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the Indians according to "moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust," the Lonewolf [sic] suit refash-
ioned to suit the convenience of a conquering people
imposing its will.37
Yet, Mr. Lazarus makes no reference to the extensive scholarly
criticism of this astounding doctrine.38 More telling perhaps is his
failure to consider the cultural implications of such a doctrine on
a people who saw the treaty as more than mere political expedi-
ence, and who considered land as more than some compensable
property interest.39 The lawyer-client relationship described in
37. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 170. The "guardian-ward" relationship is adumbrated
by Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). In
Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall also characterized Indian tribes in the following
classic (positive) statement: "They may, more correctly, perhaps be denominated domestic
dependent nations." Id. at 17.
38. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 841, 856 (1990). The following quotation is a small excerpt of the sweeping
scholarly criticism of the plenary power doctrine collected by Professor Clinton.
The illegitimacy of federal assertions of such sweeping unilateral authority
frequently is proclaimed in Indian country. Indeed, scholars consistently have
questioned the purported doctrine of plenary federal authority over Indians
because of the lack of any textual roots for the doctrine in the Constitution, the
breadth of its implications, and the lack of any tribal consent to such broad
federal authority. Therefore, many commentators have sought out limits on that
authority. E.g., [Milner S.] Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J., 367-113 (suggesting lack of textual authority for plenary power
... ); [Robert] Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal
Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979,
996-1001 (1981) (suggesting inherent limits in the reach of the Indian commerce
clause); [Richard B.] Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ.
L. REV. 365 (1989) (arguing for Indian consent as a limitation on federal
authority); [Robert T.] Coulter, The Denial of Legal Remedies to Indian Nations
Under US. Law, in NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD COMMITTEE ON NATIVE
AMERICAN STRUGGLES, RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 103, 106 (1982) ("[T]here is
not textual support in the Constitution for the proposition that Congress has
plenary authority over Indian nations."); [Nell Jessup] Newton, Federal Power
over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 261-67
(1984) (suggesting due process and takings limitations).
Id.
39. As insightfully noted by Father Peter John Powell, the well-known historian and
anthropologist,
[W]hites rarely, if ever, have understood the sacredness of the context in which
treaties were concluded by Lakota people ..... "The pipe never fails," my
people the Cheyennes, say. For the pipe is the great sacramental, the great
sacred means that provides unity between the Creator and the people. Any
treaty that was signed was a sacred agreement because it was sealed by the
smoking of the pipe. It was not signed by the Chiefs and headmen before the
pipe had been passed. Then the smoking of the pipe sealed the treaty, making
the agreement holy and binding.
Thus, for the Lakotas, the obligations sealed with the smoking of the pipe
were sacred obligations.
ROXANNE DUNBAR ORTIZ, THE GREAT SIOUX NATION 106 (1977) (quoting Peter John Pow-
ell, The Sacred Treaty).
For a discussion of the land as a "sacred text" within Lakota culture and tradition, see
Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation As Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. REV. 246
(1989).
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Black Hills/White Justice is monocultural and one dimensional.4 °
The lawyers are smart, they know how the system "works," and
they devise the attendant strategies to "win." However, there is
no awareness that a "victory" which results in financial compensa-
tion only, without land return and without full consideration of
the ethical, moral, and cultural implications of the treaty issue,
might not be completely satisfactory to the clients.41
The fact that the treaty claim is blithely dismissed by the
Supreme Court in a footnote,42 when coupled with the observa-
tion of Mr. Lazarus that his father seldom traveled to Sioux coun-
try,43 and that "[h]e did his job at arm's length from his clients ' 44 is
therefore not surprising. One would not have to be in Sioux coun-
try very long to ascertain the centrality of the treaty issue to the
Sioux Nation "client. '45 Maybe the treaty issue was not a "win-
ner," but perhaps thoughtful lawyer-client dialogue might have
developed it as part of a comprehensive legal strategy that could
not only "win," but could demonstrate cultural fidelity and lawyer-
40. See, e.g., Gerald P. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically
and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989)
(suggesting the necessity of special law school training in order to make lawyers sensitive to
differences among their clients). Lopez argues that
[legal education conceives of and treats people, their traditions, their
experiences, and their institutions as essentially fungible. It declares, at least
tacitly, that who people are, how they live, how they struggle, how they suffer,
how they interact with others, how others interact with them, and how they
relate to conventional governmental and corporate power need not be taken
into account in any sustained and serious way in training lawyers. Generic legal
education teaches law students to approach practice as if all people and all social
life were homogenous.
Id. at 307. This indifference in the legal academy "reflects in part a reluctance or refusal by
many in the mainstream to acknowledge subordination as a pervasive phenomena." Id. at
306.
41. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2280, 2302 (1989). Professor Ball observes:
Their counsel, inexplicably, acceded to the proposition that the United States
could legally abrogate the Fort Laramie Treaty and that the United States
held title to Sioux and all Indian land ....
[T]he courts are not confined to money damages. They and the Congress
could respond with flexibility. They could return the land, certainly at least
those considerable portions of it that are public and are held by the federal
government. Moreover the voice of the Sioux can certainly be better heard in
the judicial process through a different quality of legal representation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
42. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 411 n.27 (1980).
43. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 312-13. He "submitted cordial but formal reports to the
tribal council, recounting progress in the claims and frankly assessing their future
prospects." Id.
44. Id. at 313.
45. For example, I witnessed a public meeting on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in the
mid-1970s in which Mr. Sonosky was loudly booed when he sought to minimize the
significance of the treaty issue.
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client integrity. Sadly, this potential solution completely eludes
Mr. Lazarus because he does not see the lawyer-client relationship
as a problem in the first instance.
A final, broader illustration of this pernicious liberalism
involves an examination of the period following the 1980 Supreme
Court decision 46 regarding the Black Hills. The Sioux Nation
objective of seeking land restoration as part of the ultimate resolu-
tion to the Black Hills issue was simply not attainable within the
framework of litigation against the federal government. Neither
Congress nor the federal judiciary has ever authorized land resto-
ration as a judicial remedy in the context of Indian land claims
litigation. Land restoration may only be effectuated by specific
congressional enactments.47 Thus, the attention of the Sioux
Nation eventually turned to Congress.
The first version of the Sioux Nation's effort to persuade Con-
gress to restore its land was (and is) entitled the "Sioux Nation
Black Hills Act."'48 It is popularly referred to as the "Bradley Bill"
after its prime sponsor, Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey. Sena-
tor Bradley, the former New York Knicks basketball player,
became friends with a number of Lakota people as the result of
basketball camps in which he participated on several reservations
in South Dakota. He agreed to sponsor the bill in the absence of
any sponsors from the South Dakota congressional delegation.
The proposed Sioux Nation Black Hills Act has three major
components:
1) Restore the approximately 1.3 million acres in the Black
Hills still held by the federal government to the Sioux Nation;49
2) Provide financial compensation along the lines decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1980;50 and
3) Establish a Sioux Nation Council to govern the restored
area.
5 1
Mr. Lazarus' assessment of the potential of this effort is rather
bleak and somewhat haughty:
[T]he notion of holding out for a better deal-a return of
46. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
47. See, e.g., Alaska Native Land Claims Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (1988); Maine Indian
Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-29 (1988).
48. S. 705, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987). See also H.R. 5680, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.(1990) (Sioux Nation Black Hills Restoration Act of 1990) ("The Phil Stevens/Grey Eagle
Bill").
49. H.R. 5680 § 4.
50. Id. § 10.
51. Id. §§ 13-14.
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the Black Hills themselves and perhaps a lot more money
in damages-was enormously attractive, especially to a
people ignorant of Washington and unable to assess inde-
pendently their chances for success.52
The bill, as well as its successors, essentially has gone nowhere.
The uniform opposition of the three-person South Dakota congres-
sional delegation has effectively stymied any movement in Con-
gress. What is needed is not necessarily more adroitness in the
halls of Congress courtesy of "liberal" insiders,53 but the ability to
mount a grass roots campaign in South Dakota (and elsewhere) to
develop an Indian /non-Indian coalition in support of the Bradley
Bill or other similar legislation. Such a coalition has yet to materi-
alize. There is no doubt that the building of such a coalition would
be a difficult task,54 but it is the challenge of a commitment to jus-
tice and the democratic process. Curiously, this is not a strategy
that has occurred to Mr. Lazarus. It is, I guess, just not a part of
the mentality of Indian law liberalism. Everything begins and
ends within the capital beltway and the expensive suites of its law-
yers and lobbyists. It is this kind of thinking that inevitably pre-
serves a "guardian/ward" mentality.
What Mr. Lazarus does discuss in the context of legislative
redress is especially truncated. He fails, for example, to indicate
that Congress has on a number of occasions passed legislation that
provided for land restoration. Two notable instances include the
Alaska Native Lands Claims Settlement Act 55 and the Maine
Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 56 both of which involved
comparable issues of land, money, and jurisdiction. The Alaska
Native settlement process involved over 500 million acres and one
billion dollars, which arguably makes the Black Hills situation
rather modest in comparison. The essential point of this illustra-
tion is that Congress has acted in this area, and some sense of this
context in Mr. Lazarus' book would have rendered his assessment
of the likelihood of congressional action more realistic.
More troubling, however, is Mr. Lazarus' failure to actually
identify the specifics of South Dakota (official) opposition to legisla-
52. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 406.
53. There is no doubt of the value of liberal "insiders" to this movement, but they do
not constitute the beginning and the end of such efforts.
54. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D.
L. REv. 230 (1991). The racism and ignorance surrounding this issue in South Dakota is
extensive. Id.
55. Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
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tive redress in the Black Hills matter. He merely notes that
"[these] non-Indian constituents, never friendly to the Indians
beforehand, grew virtually apoplectic at the prospect of giving the
Sioux substantive civil jurisdiction over Black Hills lands that pro-
duce 600 million in annual revenue from tourism, mining, and
timber harvesting. '5 7 His statement is, of course, true, but woe-
fully incomplete-the legacy and animus of race prejudice.
Not surprisingly, South Dakota public officials articulate their
opposition differently. According to some public officials, the pro-
posed legislation should be rejected because it offends the First
Amendment, intrudes improperly into state sovereignty, creates
needless "checkerboard" jurisdiction, and is not historically justi-
fied.58 These claims are significant in that they establish the floor
for much of the needed public debate and discussion in South
Dakota and elsewhere. Obviously no progress is possible on the
issue without understanding the terms of the debate. It is there-
fore all the more remarkable that Lazarus' "comprehensive" work
does so little to inform readers about the current contours of the
controversy and struggle.
Mr. Lazarus does a better job of chronicling the fragile unity
of support for the Bradley Bill achieved by individual Indians and
the tribes that make up the Sioux Nation, before this unity dis-
solved with the appearance of Phil Stevens5 9 and his divisive tac-
tics and strategy. Ultimately, Mr. Lazarus ends the book amidst
despair about the "false hopes" on both sides of the Black Hills
issue: "There has been no cleansing of guilt on the one side,
neither adjustment nor deliverance on the other."'60  Yet, he
ignores the fact that the promise remains that some kind of legisla-
tive redress could achieve a measure of justice and fulfillment on
both sides.
The theme of justice, despite its presence in the book's title, is
not really addressed in Black Hills/White Justice. Mr. Lazarus'
view seems to be that the "United States held itself to a higher
57. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 419.
58. George S. Mickelson, Governor's Letter, WICAZO SA REVIEW, Spring 1988, at 26-28;
John P. Guhin, The Black Hills Bill: Expressions of Doubt as to Its Justification and
Constitutionality, WICAZO SA REVIEW, Spring 1988, at 51-55; Frank Pommersheim, The
Black Hills Case: On the Cusp of History, WICAZO SA REVIEW, Spring 1988, at 18-24
(discussing land restoration in the Black Hills controversy).
59. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 423-26. Mr. Stevens claimed that the Sioux Nation was
actually entitled to $3.1 billion in compensation (in addition to land restoration) and that he
could convince Congress to pass such legislation. Id. at 423. He also claimed to be a
descendant of an Oglala chief by the name of Standing Bear. Id. These brazen assertions
undermined a good deal of tribal unity on the Bradley Bill. Id. at 424.
60. Id. at 427.
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level of accountability ' '6 ' than the Sioux did in building their
"plains empire." Therefore, the Sioux Nation should be grateful
and exit stage left. Despite these undocumented, provocative, and
cranky assertions, justice remains as elusive as ever. Justice cannot
easily be reduced to identifying a specific result in advance, but
rather emerges from an ongoing dialogue which culminates in a
sense "that one party's story is more morally compelling than the
other's story."62 This dialogue is all the more important in the con-
text of matters involving race, culture, and history of which the
Black Hills issue is almost paradigmatic. Justice emanates from
conversation 63 rather than declaration. Mr. Lazarus' book offers
little in this vein beyond culture-bound frustration with what
appears to him to be Sioux Nation intransigence and unwillingness
to yield its status as a victim. 64
Part of dialogue requires listening. Yet the dialogue within
the Sioux Nation itself seems to have eluded Mr. Lazarus. For
example, both the Lakota Times65 and the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe 66 surveyed tribal members about the Black Hills issue and
asked about money-only or money-and-land remedial solutions.
Both of these surveys indicated strong majority (but not unani-
mous) support for money-plus-land settlement. In addition, in a
recent newspaper column by Alex Lunderman, Chairman of the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Lunderman notes the lack of agreement
among Lakota tribes about the best way to settle the Black Hills
issue, and also makes the frank admission that "[s]uch doubt should
not make any of us feel good about ourselves. '67 The promise of
such introspection and the resurgence of honest and respectful
61. Id. at 413. Mr. Lazarus contends that since the Sioux Nation displaced other tribes
on the plains, they have no cause to complain about the quality of justice rendered by the
United States courts in the matter of the Black Hills.
62. Anthony D'Amato, Rethinking Legal Education, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 52 (1990).
63. Id. at 52 n.117.
64. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 428. Specifically, for example, Mr. Lazarus states:
As for the Sioux, the claims process has encouraged them to evade any real
responsibility for repairing the tragic condition of their lives. They have come to
believe that their status as victims, their sense of grievance, is their greatest
source of strength and only hope for unity. And in this belief the Sioux have
abandoned any meaningful attempt to control their own destiny in favor of
rhetorical claims to sovereignty and independence.
Id.
65. Alex Lunderman, We Must Prove Worthy of Responsibility, LAKOTA TIMES, April
22, 1992, at B2. (discussing the survey conducted in 1991.)
66. Conversation with Cheyenne River Sioux Attorney General's office (March 1993)
(discussing the survey conducted in 1988).
67. Lunderman, supra note 65, at B2. This article appeared in the LAKOTA TIMES
after the publication of Black Hills/White Justice, but it is illustrative of the genuine
sentiment that Mr. Lazarus seems incapable of finding or identifying.
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debate unfortunately remains outside the confines of the Lazarus
text.
IV. CONTEXT AND SITUATEDNESS
Such a wide-ranging legal and historical controversy as the
Black Hills issue inevitably requires that analytic attention be paid
to context and situatedness. For the Sioux Nation, land restoration
is a cornerstone cultural commitment. Economic considerations
are important, but not as central. The Black Hills land is of pri-
mary importance because of its sacredness, its nexus to the cultural
well being of Lakota people, and its role as a mediator in their
relationship with all other living things. As noted by Gerald Clif-
ford, Chairman of the Black Hills Steering Committee, "[u]ntil we
get back on track in our relationship to the earth, we cannot
straighten out any of our relationships to ourselves, to other
people." 68
Land is inherent to Lakota people. It is their cultural center-
piece-the fulcrum of material and spiritual well being. Without
it, there is neither balance nor center. The Black Hills are a cen-
tral part of this "sacred text" and constitute its prophetic core:
As part of the "sacred text," the land-like sacred texts in
other traditions-is not primarily a book of answers, "but
rather a principal symbol of, perhaps the principal symbol
of, and thus a central occasion of recalling and heeding,
the fundamental aspirations of the tradition." It sum-
mons the heart and the spirit to difficult labor. In this
sense, the "sacred text" constantly disturbs-it serves a
prophetic function in the life of the community. The
land, therefore, constantly evokes the fundamental
Lakota aspirations to live in harmony with Mother Earth
and to embody the traditional virtues of wisdom, courage,
generosity, and fortitude. The "sacred text" itself guaran-
tees nothing, but it does hold the necessary potential to
successfully mediate the past of the tradition with its pres-
ent predicament.6 9
In addition, there is the assertion in certain Lakota creation
myths that the Black Hills are not only holy, but they are the lit-
eral place of the origins of Lakota people thousands of years ago.
68. William Grieder, The Heart of Everything That Is, ROLLING STONE, May 7, 1987, at
62.
69. Pommersheim, supra note 39, at 269 (footnotes omitted).
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Such claims, as noted in Black Hills!White Justice, are sharply con-
tested based on (non-Indian) readings of the historical and archeo-
logical record.7 °
All of this is potential for a primal clash-a clash that seems
irreconcilable because the "truth" assertions of each side appear
grounded in the opposing and largely icompatible realms of sci-
ence and myth. Such a clash is not, however, unique to this
Indian/non-Indian dispute, but also exists within the dominant cul-
ture itself. Mr. Lazarus seems to notice this in passing, but
smoothes it out and draws the wrong conclusion. He analogizes
the Lakota myth to a "'creationist' interpreting Genesis as the lit-
eral story of man's beginnings,"'" intimating, of course, that the
"creationist" is wrong. Yet, in fact, the teachings of most of the
Jewish and Christian faiths instruct that Genesis is literally true,
though many (western) Christians and Jews, while not denying
these teachings, also seem equally at home with the scientific doc-
trine of evolution. 72
This apparent paradox is illuminated by the insightful com-
mentary of Marilynne Robinson:
I consider myths to be complex narratives in which
human cultures stabilize and encode their deepest ambiv-
alences. They give a form to contradiction which has the
appearance of resolution ....
Myth is never plausible narrative. It asks for another
kind of assent. To anyone for whom it does not strike an
important equipoise, it seems absurd.7 3
It is possible that discussion of the Black Hills issue will proceed, at
least in part, in this difficult iealm, and therefore some caution
ought to be observed. The conventional discourse of law, history,
and even politics is not well suited for the mythological sphere, but
special sensitivity to context and culture will surely help
understanding.
Vine Deloria, Jr., a leading Sioux scholar and intellectual,
70. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 417. "The most careful archaeological and archival
studies of scholars indicate that the Lakota had their origins, like all of the Sioux family, over
East in what is now Minnesota." DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES (NATURE
AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAN WEST) 121 (1992).
71. Id.
72. But see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987) (noting that the doctrine of
creationism is not science; the doctrine of evolution is a science). See also RONALD
GOODMAN, LAKOTA STAR KNOWLEDGE (1991) (providing a Lakota perspective on
astronomy that supports claims of centuries old presence of the Sioux in the Black Hills).
73. Marilynne Robinson, Hearing Silence: Western Myth Reconsidered, NORTHERN
LIGHTS, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1992, at 12.
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points to the Black Hills issue as pivotal in providing the opportu-
nity to begin the process of establishing greater economic and
political independence for Lakota tribes from the strictures of fed-
eral hegemony and control.7 4 Some kind of land restoration
should play a vital role in this process.75 All of this, as wisely sug-
gested by Professor Deloria in his introduction to Native American
Testimony, is not to excoriate the "white man" to once again to
come to his senses, but rather to indicate that
the lesson which seems so hard to learn is that of dignity
and respect. Some of the voices contained herein may
appear to be complaining about the loss of land, the loss of
a way of life, or the continuing propensity of the white
man to change the terms of the debate to favor himself.
But deep down these are cries about dignity, complaints
about the lack of respect.7
6
Any of these contexts, voices, and points of view are subject to
contrary evidence and opposing contentions. Yet, without
acknowledging or considering them, you only have proof of Vine
Deloria, Jr.'s trenchant observation: "What is missing in federal
Indian law is the Indians. 77
Two observations about situatedness are in order. I have writ-
ten about the Black Hills case elsewhere and support some kind of
land restoration and legislative redress.7 8 I did so because I
believe that is how justice may be achieved, and because of the
unique opportunity it provides to right an historical wrong-an
opportunity that history seldom provides. This explains, in part,
my strong disagreement with much of the Lazarus book and my
impetus to write about it.
Nevertheless, one never knows what other readers bring to
their interaction with the text. For example, the Dean of the Uni-
versity of South Dakota law school is a member of a small reading
group made up of friends, including some of the leading educators
and politicians in the eastern part of South Dakota. He chose
Black Hills/White Justice for the group. The Dean invited me to
their discussion of the book. They, including the Dean, uniformly
gave the book high praise for "telling it like it is" with such com-
74. Vine Deloria, Jr., Reflections of the Black Hills Claim, WICAZO SA REVIEW, Spring
1988, at 33, 38.
75. Id.
76. Vine Deloria, Jr., Forward to NABOKOV, supra note 3, at XVIII.
77. Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 205 (1989).
78. Pommersheim, supra note 58.
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ments as "we really did steal the Black Hills!" I was a little non-
plussed. I explained some of my problems with the text as I've
suggested here. Well, yes, they could see that, but their enthusi-
asm for the book remained undampened. The significant point in
all of this is to note that readers often do bring different back-
grounds and expectations to their interaction with the text, which
may, in turn, greatly affect their interpretation. Given the experi-
ence just described, I believe it is necessary to acknowledge the
potential range of readers' legitimate responses.
V. DIFFERENCES
"It is not necessary that eagles should be crows.9
Inevitably, much of the Black Hills controversy centers on
"differences" between the dominant non-Indian society and the
Sioux Nation. These differences have existed from the very first
''contact" between Europeans and the indigenous people of this
continent. What has emerged in this political and legal discourse
is the perception of the Native American as the "other." Most
often this "other" is characterized negatively as "savage" and
"uncivilized," or sometimes positively as "natural" or in harmony
with nature. In Indian law, this characterization is typified by
Chief Justice Marshall's prototypical analogy which likened the
relationship of the federal government to the Indian tribes as "that
of a ward to [a] guardian."8 °
This bleak assessment finds its contemporary analog in decla-
rations about tribal sovereignty as being of a unique and limited
kind, subject to complete defeasance by Congress.8 ' As Professor
Minow notes in her insightful analysis, such statements do not
describe "inherent" differences, but rather, these statements
reflect the social construction of difference that is largely the func-
tion of the misallocation of power which allows such "differences"
to be enforced as normative.82 Such differences appear and
develop sociological "reality" through the process of comparison.
In the context of Native American culture, the ascendancy of the
white middle-class standards of "progress" and material well being
are assumed and seldom discussed.
This is most certainly true of Mr. Lazarus' analysis. Although
his analysis is comprehensive in some respects, he does not explore
79. NABOKOV, supra note 3 at XVIII (quoting Sitting Bull) (emphasis added).
80. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1931).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
82. See MINOW, supra note 3, at 49-78.
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this issue in much detail. It is, perhaps, more accurate to say that
Mr. Lazarus looks at half of the difference equation as if it were the
whole and (erroneously) pronounces the difficult equation solved.
Although he does not employ any of the conceptual rubric set out
in the Professor Minow's book, his own analysis tracks a portion of
it. There is no doubt that the United States government acted
improperly in "taking" the Black Hills. Nevertheless, the rationale
of the federal government was the necessity and inevitability of its
act, the march of progress and manifest destiny. As Justice Rehn-
quist stated: "It seems to me quite unfair to judge by the light of
'revisionist' historians or the mores of another era actions that
were taken under pressure of time more than a century ago."8 3
Mr. Lazarus' book amply documents this use of difference as nega-
tive and discriminatory in the Black Hills controversy. This
"stigma" of difference has nothing to commend it and its use needs
to be resisted and eradicated. Indeed, this is one way of reading
Black Hills/White Justice, as the story of a successful attempt to
overcome the invidious stigma of difference.
Yet, the fact that this is only half of the dilemma of difference
is apparently what so exasperates Mr. Lazarus. There is not only
the stigma of difference but a (paradoxical) correlative of a "pride"
of difference. Many people or groups who do not want to be dis-
criminated against, nevertheless, take pride in their cultural differ-
ences and want these differences to be recognized and respected.
In his book, Black Hills/White Justice, Lazarus neither sees nor
understands the significance of this strand of difference. There-
fore, the book lacks the empathy (which does not always mean
agreement) necessary to make the contending views equally
human and vital in the pressing historical drama of the Black Hills.
An interesting contrast to Mr. Lazarus' book is found in the
approach of the environmental historian Donald Worster. a He
accomplishes much simply by identifying the right questions,
which are so often missed, and in turn, precluding any reasonable
expectation of obtaining the right answers. Professor Worster
observes that:
we can do something about what has happened over the
last century or so in the American West and what is still
happening there today. We can ask, and because we pro-
fess to live by principle, not by mere expediency, we must
83. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 435 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
84. See supra note 70, at 106-53.
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ask: what does the past reveal about the land and its
rightful ownership? Are the Lakota really the legitimate
owners of the Black Hills? ... Did the white man's courts
grant them a fair hearing and a just compensation, or
were there critical aspects the courts ignored? Does the
religious significance of the Hills give them a claim?
Have the Hills in fact been traditionally held sacred in
Lakota eyes, and if so, for how long?... Answers, how-
ever, will not be simple or obvious or easy; otherwise, the
questions would have been addressed instead of being
swept aside.85
Professor Worster's answers to these questions do not always
"favor" the Lakota, but they are nuanced and culturally sensitive
particularly in the context of the "sacredness" of the Hills. 8 His
discussion about the sacred and the profane, the role of time and
change in this area, and the varying impact of the sacred on differ-
ent individuals is particularly illuminating. For example, he rests
much of his opinion on the elucidation of the insights of the semi-
nal scholar of religious studies, Mircea Eliade. 7 Thus, his discus-
sion focuses on how perception of what is sacred evolves and
changes over time, and how a sense of the sacred is necessary for
full identity and renewal. Professor Worster is thinking and listen-
ing and has an enviable concern for healing and "mutual
respect,""8 premised on the need for enduring and honest
dialogue.
Lastly, and most unfortunately, Mr. Lazarus' observations
(particularly in the last chapter of Black Hills!White Justice) serve
only to deepen the grooves of negative stereotypes about Indian
people and the reservation. For example, he states:
For many Sioux, the dominant pull of reservation life was
irresistible. Along the gullied dirt roads of rural Sioux vil-
lages, drunks wandered like aimless phantoms. Many had
taken to drinking the household cleanser Lysol, which
85. Id. at 117.
86. See id. at 121-42. "The most careful archaeological and archival studies of scholars
indicate that the Lakota had their origins, like all of the Sioux family, over East in what is
now Minnesota." Id. at 121. "Their loss in 1877 did just that [profaned them] and thus
interfered with the Lakota's religious freedom of expression in the most vital way. Lakota
religion came under a threat of extinction, and today it cannot survive unless the Hills are
returned." Id. at 136.
87. See id. at 138-142 (discussing Professor Eliade's seminal book THE SACRED AND
THE PROFANE and its application to the Black Hills).
88. Id. at 153.
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was cheap, densely alcoholic, and "a real quick high."' 9
Of course, alcoholism is a significant problem on many Sioux reser-
vations. Yet, to present this observation without the sense of the
remarkable change in recent years in attitudes and efforts of
Lakota people to combat these ravages seems remarkably ignorant
of context and devoid of understanding. For example, Lakota peo-
ple sponsored sobriety walks, alcohol-free events, alcohol abuse
and drug education courses in the Indian-controlled community
colleges, and "red road" to recovery treatment programs on the
reservation. Certainly, the sense of tribal struggle against this ter-
rible affliction is more real than ever before, but these actions do
not fit Mr. Lazarus' central motif of dependence and passivity.
Differences persist and often appear likely to prevent any
breakthrough in truly understanding and resolving the Black Hills
issue in a mutually acceptable way. Perhaps this is so, but libera-
tion is also within our reach. The dominant non-Indian commu-
nity needs to listen and heed this observation:
My grandmother told me that the white man never lis-
tens to anyone, but he expects everyone to listen to him
.... The wind isn't a good listener! The wind wants to
speak, and we know how to listen. My father always told
me that an Eskimo is a listener. We have survived here
because we know how to listen. The white people in the
lower forty-eight talk. They are like the wind; they sweep
over everything. 90
If we listen to each other, we will not necessarily erase difference,
but perhaps use it to our mutual advantage. In fact, Professor
Minow suggests that this realization is pivotal to understanding the
difference dilemma:
The point is not to find the new, true perspective; the
point is to strive for impartiality by admitting our partial-
ity. The perspective of those who are labeled "different"
may offer an important challenge to those who impose
the label, but it is a corrective lens, another partial view,
not the absolute truth. It is the complexity of our recipro-
cal realities and the conflict between the realities that
constitute us which we need to understand.9'
89. LAZARUS, supra note 3, at 420.
90. NABOKOV, supra note 3, at 431.
91. MINOW, supra note 3, at 376 (footnotes omitted).
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The ultimate goal is therefore not to undo difference, but rather to
create solidarity; a quality the chief source of which is the imagina-
tion with its ability "to see strange people as fellow sufferers.1
2
Such efforts flow not from mere academic inquiry, but from work
of the heart and mind:
Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is
created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular
details of the pain and humiliation of others, unfamiliar
sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more
difficult to marginalize people different from ourselves by
thinking, "They do not feel as we would."93
VI. CONCLUSION
The unresolved Black Hills issues serve as a constant reminder
about the challenges of history, national diversity, and the ideal of
justice. History is never really "past"; diversity seldom recedes
into assimilation; and justice cannot often be obtained by money
alone. There is, perhaps, no easy way to achieve resolution of the
many questions posed by the Black Hills controversy, but there are
better, though more arduous ways. They are the ways that lead to
commitment, respect, imagination, and engagement.
92. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY XVI (1984).
93. Id.
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